[ISAFIS Newsletter #16] Tourism as a Geoeconomic Weapon: China’s Travel Boycott of Japan
Written by: Pelangi Retta Gyani Sihombing Staff of Research and Development
Tokyo has always been a city of motion. Its neon districts glow late into the night, taxis weave between crowds, and the sound of luggage wheels rolling across train stations reminds locals that Japan has become one of the world’s most visited destinations. For years, one group of visitors stood out more than any other. Chinese tourists were not just guests. They were the backbone of Japan’s tourism revival after the pandemic.
That is why the silence that suddenly swept across major tourist hubs in November felt unreal to many workers on the ground. Ginza’s luxury shops, usually full of Mandarin speaking customers eager to shop tax free, became quiet. Airport duty free stores began to cut staff schedules. Hotels reported cancellations not by dozens, but by thousands.
A Geopolitical Trigger with Rapid Economic Damage
The spark was ignited when Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that a potential military attack on Taiwan would pose an existential threat to Japan and could justify collective self defense. China responded strongly. Within days, travel agencies and airlines in China received signals to discourage travel to Japan. There was no official law, no decree printed in newspapers. Yet the effect was dramatic. Tour bookings from China to Japan plunged by up to 80 percent (Campbell & Geddie, 2025).
Losses began accumulating instantly. Chinese tourists were responsible for about one fifth of all visitor arrivals in Japan and they spend more per person than any other nationality (China Travel, 2025). Analysts at Nomura Research Institute estimated that if the situation continued for a full year, Japan could lose around 2.2 trillion yen in tourism revenue, equivalent to nearly 14 billion US dollars (Campbell & Geddie, 2025). Japan’s tourism and retail sectors had barely recovered from the pandemic, so the sudden disappearance of Chinese tourists hit like a second crisis.
Business owners felt the shock before the government did. A hotel chain in Hokkaido reported booking losses that forced them to postpone a winter expansion plan (Johnston, 2025). A major department store in Tokyo announced that sales of cosmetics and luxury handbags fell more than 40 percent in the week following the boycott (Asahi Shimbun, 2025). Entire travel companies built around Chinese tour groups suddenly struggled to survive.
Tourism Pressure Expands into Culture and Trade
Soon after discouraging travel, China also halted the release of Japanese films in Chinese cinemas, including several popular anime titles (Lee & Geddie, 2025). Film studios that expected blockbuster holiday revenue were left with empty screens. Days later, China increased inspections and restrictions on Japanese seafood imports, repeating a pattern seen during earlier diplomatic crises (Kyodo News, 2025). Beijing insisted that the measures were based on safety and cultural considerations. However, the timing revealed the deeper strategic calculation at work.
The message was clear. China was using the tools of ordinary life travel, culture, and trade to signal that Japan crossed one of Beijing’s core geopolitical boundaries concerning Taiwan.
Why tourism? Because it hits fast and hard. Unlike long term trade dependencies, tourism can be redirected almost instantly. A discouraging statement from Beijing can generate mass cancellations in a matter of hours. Unlike military responses, tourism retaliation does not risk global escalation. Unlike sanctions, it does not require the cooperation of international institutions. It offers both pain and plausible deniability.
A New Lesson for the Region
Japan suddenly found itself navigating not only an economic crisis, but a strategic decision. If Japan softened its rhetoric on Taiwan, it might reduce China’s pressure. If Japan held firm, it would need to absorb the economic cost. For now, Tokyo has refused to retract its remarks, claiming that the stability of the Taiwan Strait is essential for Japan’s own national security (NHK World, 2025). At the same time, the Japanese embassy in China warned its nationals to remain cautious due to rising anti-Japanese sentiment (Lee & Geddie, 2025).
Across the Asia Pacific region, policymakers are watching closely. The boycott is not only a punishment for Japan. It is a demonstration to the world of how geoeconomic leverage can be used. Countries that rely heavily on Chinese tourism such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore now see a new form of geopolitical vulnerability. Tourism is no longer only a tool for cultural friendship. It can become a political pressure valve.
The Japan case also shows how cultural products like film and food exports can be woven into statecraft. Geoeconomic power today is not limited to rare earth minerals or energy pipelines. It extends to airline bookings, movie tickets, and supermarket shelves.
For ordinary Japanese workers, the cost is personal. When tour groups do not arrive, the guide loses income. When luxury sales collapse, store workers are sent home early. When hotels cut staff, a local community suffers. The travel boycott illustrates that economic statecraft does not only pressure leaders. It touches the lives of ordinary citizens.
Looking Ahead: Will the Pressure Fade or Deepen?
The coming months will determine whether this is a temporary retaliation or the beginning of a longer period of pressure. Much depends on diplomacy, domestic politics, and how both governments interpret the costs and benefits of escalation. Experts warn that if China sees this strategy as successful, travel restrictions may be used again in future disputes. Japan is already discussing strategies to diversify tourism sources, strengthen Southeast Asian and Western markets, and reduce single country dependence (Hiyama & Davies, 2025).
In a world where power does not always look like tanks or missiles, this geopolitical confrontation has an unexpected symbol. It is not a battlefield, not a naval fleet, and not a government podium. It is a souvenir shop standing open, filled with merchandise, but with no tourists stepping inside.
Reference
Asahi Shimbun. (2025). Retail sector hit as Chinese tourist spending drops sharply in Tokyo. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/1616770.
Hiyama, H. & Davies, S. (2025). Japan-China spat over Taiwan comments sinks tourism stocks. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2025/11/17/taiwan-comments-tourism-stocks/.
Johnston, E. (2025). Japan’s dispute with China may impact Hokkaido tourism this winter. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/11/21/japan/society/hokkaido-china-japan-tourists/.
Kyodo News. (2025). China reimposes Japanese seafood import suspension: source. https://english.kyodonews.net/articles/-/65198.
China Travel. (2025). ‘Limited alternatives’: why Japan will struggle to replace China’s tourists.https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3333697/limited-alternatives-why-japan-will-struggle-replace-chinas-tourists.
NHK World. (2025). Japan-China tensions may take longer to ease. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20251120_N01/.
Campbell, J & Geddie, J. (2025). Japan counts cost of China’s travel boycott as tensions flare. https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/japan-counts-cost-chinas-travel-boycott-tensions-flare-2025-11-19/.
Lee, L. & Geddie, J. (2025). China suspends Japanese film releases as diplomatic crisis deepens. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-suspends-japanese-film-releases-diplomatic-crisis-deepens-2025-11-18/.
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