Reassessing Indonesia’s Recent Controversial Foreign Policies: What Prabowo Could Do?

Author: Muhammad Dafa Ramadhan from Research and Development ISAFIS

As Indonesia experiences a government transition from President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo administration to the newly-elected President Prabowo Subianto, one might expect a significant yet moderate shift in the country’s foreign policy and diplomatic style. The public sees the new leader as the “foreign policy president,” as Prabowo’s deep interest in foreign policy set himself apart from his predecessor who was not a fond of foreign matter. While having a foreign policy prodigy in the nation’s leadership is not bad at all, making an unexpected yet controversial foreign policy is quite another. Shortly after President Prabowo was inaugurated in October 2024, he sent his politically-appointed non-career foreign minister Sugiono—the President’s loyalist and “ideological son”—to attend BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia and express Indonesia’s intention in joining the group, followed by the announcement of formal full-membership status earlier this year on behalf of fostering “South-South Cooperation” and affirming Indonesia’s “Free and Active Foreign Policy” principle (Bhwana, 2025). This decision has captivated heavy public attention as Prabowo’s keen interest in joining BRICS marks a departure from the previous government under Jokowi whose bid in the group membership was more cautious and pragmatic, fearing backlash from key partners in the West (Wardhana & Dharmaputra, 2025). Another controversial move is his decision to strike a deal with China to start a joint-development project in the explicitly-stated “overlapping claims” area in South China Sea, fueling allegation that Indonesia implicitly recognizes unilateral Chinese assertive claims on “Nine-Dash Line” area, a decision that can break Indonesia’s well-established normative position towards the dispute (Strangio, 2024). The controversies and debates surrounding the two policies can be understood in a way that these policies allegedly disturb Indonesia’s long-standing tradition of maintaining its reputation as a non-aligned nation abroad amidst heightening geopolitical tension between world’s great powers.

One might argue that despite their controversial departure from a long-standing tradition in Indonesian foreign policy, we can positively assume that these new policies possibly carry out potential benefit, mainly economic, for Indonesia in a more pragmatic manner. In BRICS accession case, some argue that the membership can deliver more economic benefit to the country by giving it more access to new economic partnership and investment opportunities with other potential BRICS member, such as India and China. Others also argue that the membership can generate alternative funding for the nation’s development through the group’s New Development Bank (NDB) rather than relying too much on western financial institution (Syarif, 2025). The potential economic benefits obtained from China’s economy might also explain the controversial deal President Prabowo made with China on cooperating in South China Sea’s disputed area, considering China’s important status as Indonesia’s most important trade and investment partner. However, the actual benefits generated from these actions perhaps are more shallow than expected, while the potential geopolitical risks are too clear to be ignored.

Though theoretically BRICS membership can generate economic benefits, there is a lack of clarity on what concrete economic advantages Indonesia would gain from the group and how Indonesia would achieve it. Even without BRICS membership, Indonesia has obtained significant amount of economic benefits from bilateral relations with each BRICS member, some of them are even key partners in terms of economic cooperation, such as China and India (Sulaiman, 2024). China has been Indonesia’s largest trading partner and investments source since the last decade, while Indonesia’s trade surplus with India has been increased last year under significant bilateral cooperation platform like Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (Sharma, 2024). Indonesia’s bid to receive development funding from BRICS also may not be as easy as joining the group since the NDB has yet to amend its regulation on granting funds to the group’s newcomer like Indonesia (Shofa, 2025). A loose and informal institutional design embedded in BRICS also adds uncertainty to Indonesia’s membership in the future due to the absence of clear and rigid mechanism in the group that guides who will get what and how.

On the other hand, the geopolitical burden embedded in Prabowo’s recent controversial foreign policies are too risky compared to its vague benefits unless his government creates a clear mitigation plan. As the world closely observes heightened geopolitical tensions between China and the US fueled with protectionist tendency from the two hegemons, many small and middle countries are forced to choose side and can be trapped into great power rivalry unless they renavigate their foreign policy carefully. Indonesia is no exception. Under current geopolitical scenario, President Prabowo’s move to enter BRICS and made a deal with China on South China Sea can be seen by Indonesia’s key western partners as playing eyes with China, risking its well-established non-aligned reputation and partnership with western countries, especially The US (Negara & Suryadinata, 2025). As the US President Donald Trump pledges to impose 20 percent tariffs on foreign goods and takes tougher stance towards China, the Indonesian government plan to offer Free Trade Agreement (FTA) mechanism as negotiating tool for the American tariffs can be hampered by possible deteriorating American trust due to seemingly closer relation with China (Yuniar, 2025). Indonesia must remember that the US is the country’s second-largest trade partner and necessary security partner in the region, thus hurting this status is certainly not in our interests list.

The absence of clear agenda and mitigation plan regarding President Prabowo’s recent decisions may also bring Indonesia deeper into great power gameplay. The joint-development agreement in the so-called “overlapping claims” area in South China Sea gives China preponderant legitimacy to assert its baseless territorial claim using its power leverage in front of weaker Southeast Asian neighbors, including Indonesia (Strangio, 2024). Neither BRICS membership is without risk with the China and Russia’s dominance inside BRICS makes the group vulnerable to be used as vehicle to promote certain geopolitical agenda against western powers, unless Indonesia is willing to actively shapes the group future agenda neutral from great power’s geopolitical interests.

Unfortunately, there is no turning back. Indonesia has to make sure that the risks embedded in its recent foreign decisions are navigated and mitigated carefully to best serve its national interests amidst intense geopolitical competition. This attempt must be equipped by clear and coherent future agenda for the BRICS membership and the joint-development deal with China, a crucial thing that regrettably was absent in Foreign Minister Annual Press Release few weeks ago. As Indonesia’s non-aligned reputation is being questioned, rebuilding key partners’ trust must also be top priority to protect core national interests. Therefore, there are several recommendations that is necessary to be done by current administration.

Firstly, Indonesia must convince its key regional and western partners that its accession into BRICS and recent bilateral development project plan with China in South China Sea has nothing to do with associating or siding into certain geopolitical bloc to avoid possible backlash, distrust, and hostility that threatens its global reputations and national interests. Hence, re-establishing Indonesia’s long-standing reputation abroad as an independent and trusted country is considered a critical task. This effort can be done not only by re-asserting Indonesia’s “Free and Active” foreign policy principle, but also by undertaking concrete and measurable diplomatic acts, such as re-engaging with key western partners in strategic sectors like national defence and regional security. Indonesia also ought to reinvigorate its reputation as trusted partner and responsible leader in ASEAN by reaffirming Indonesia’s unaltered commitment towards international law and initiating new diplomatic breakthrough to settle territorial dispute in South China Sea, such as re-arranging the implementation of the stagnant SCS Code of Conduct or even offering new kind of initiative that is inclusive and peaceful for all stakeholders. This regional trust-building effort is crucial due to Jakarta’s potentially strained relationship with ASEAN after announcing the highly-controversial SCS development project with China, although this effort might face a major difficulty considering the sensitivity of the issue.

Secondly, regarding BRICS accession, Indonesia can partially turn its risk into an opportunity by taking an active role in the group’s agenda-setting and pushing for reform in BRICS institutional design in order to benefit all members equally and avoid domination by few bigger members like Russia or China. Indonesia must actively participate in shaping BRICS future agenda path that serves its original interest, namely to offer an alternative and fair economic order for developing nations instead of serving certain geopolitical interest. Only by this way Indonesia can harness potential concrete benefits from BRICS membership and retake Indonesia’s active and non-aligned reputation amongst its key partners.

Lastly, the new administration in Jakarta has to gather as many input as possible in arranging future foreign policy agenda, notably from the experienced bureaucrats and diplomats in the Foreign Affairs Ministry. An inside source reported by Tempo said that President Prabowo and his team ignored a warning given by bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry regarding the possible consequences of having a development deal with China in South China Sea. As President Prabowo mainly sees foreign matters as his ambition and status projection rather than a matter of technocracy, involving The Foreign Ministry’s professional diplomats in foreign policymaking is considered more essential than ever before in order to avoid possible reckless foreign policy decision in the future. Having a prudent and cautiously calculated foreign policy is a must in today’s world full of competition, protectionism, and hostility.

Bibliography

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