[ISAFIS Gazette #1] Gambling with WW3: What the Trump-Zelenskyy Debate Means for Europe’s Security

Written by: Jonathan Jordan Staff of Research and Development

On Friday, 28th of February 2025, the Oval Office spiralled into a diplomatic disaster as United States President Donald Trump—along with Vice President J. D. Vance—and Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelenskyy were engaged in a heated debate regarding the ongoing war in Ukraine. The meeting between the two heads of state, which was supposed to end in the mutual signing of an agreement to grant access to Ukrainian minerals to the United States in exchange for funds needed to rebuild the Eastern European nation, resulted in nothing but an expanded rift as Trump antagonised Zelenskyy for the war that Russia started (Hutzler, 2025). This incident highlights a trend that has been feared since the announcement of Trump’s victory in the 2024 US presidential election, which is that the United States is moving away from its role as a protector of liberal democracy. For its traditional allies, such as other NATO and EU nations, this sudden, significant shift in foreign policy makes reliance on the US for security unreliable. As a result, they must achieve independence in terms of their military security. This is particularly true for European nations in NATO because of their proximity to Russia, whose leader, Putin, is not hesitant to use force as demonstrated by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. If this vulnerability were not filled by its own hands, the survival of Europe could be at risk.

Europe’s Sudden Vulnerability

To discuss the importance of European self-reliance for its security, we first need to understand the drastic change in US policy in the region. Since the end of the Second World War, the US has played a significant role in maintaining security in the area due to its economic and military prowess. It assisted Western Europe in reconstruction and became the backbone of NATO’s power against the Soviet Union and its ideology (Sayle, 2019). Even after the Cold War was over, the US still oversaw the security of the region and expanded its influence to former Soviet satellite states, such as Poland and Estonia. In 2024, the US spent 824.3 billion USD for defence, way above any other NATO member (Peterson Foundation, 2025).

However, this status is challenged as President Donald Trump adopts a different approach. His chaotic foreign policies uprooted many traditional US stances on international issues, including attitudes towards Ukraine, its traditional allies, and Russia. It would seem that the US under Trump is aligning itself more with its usual authoritarian enemies, such as Russia and China. The US also appears to intentionally loosen its grip over its sphere of influence by withdrawing from international organisations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and even with a domestic discourse of leaving NATO (Cheng & Weissert, 2025; Kilander, 2025). This signals that the US is no longer willing to pay the costs of maintaining its hegemony over Europe, thus disposing of one of the attributes of hegemony. Aside from the Oval Office disaster between Trump and Zelenskyy, this is most evident in his calling the Ukrainian president a dictator; expressing his desire for control over Greenland, Canada, and Panama; and negotiating deals alone with Russia—the most recent resulted in planned alleviation of sanctions for the world’s largest nation (Arhirova, 2025). As a result, European democracies have become insecure as their economic and military vulnerability is no longer substituted with the US domination of the post-Cold War world.

In addition, Russia is currently building its armed forces despite the war in Ukraine. Currently, the Russian armed forces comprise around 1.1 million active personnel with monthly recruitment of 25,000–30,000 soldiers. In September 2024, plans to increase this amount to 1.5 million active personnel were announced (Hackett, 2025a). Furthermore, Russia’s defence budget for 2025 was drafted to be 6.34% of its GDP, a more than 1% increase from last year’s 5.29% number. Production of equipment and refurbishment of Soviet-era platforms have rapidly increased since the war began. In 2024, Russia managed to produce or refurbish around 1,550 tanks, 5,700 armoured vehicles, 450 artillery platforms, as well as 1,800 ZARA Lancet unmanned air vehicle (UAV) loitering munitions—a growth of 220%, 150% for both armoured vehicles and artillery and 435% in production respectively (Burilkov, 2025). The war in Ukraine has also provided Russia with invaluable experience from the war in Ukraine, which contributed to its adaptation to the current military situation by improving reconnaissance for artillery. This rapid increase in military power, potentially perceived as a show of offensive capability, may pose a threat to Europe’s security. Some nations are even beginning to predict that a Russian invasion could be feasible within a few years.

In comparison, all European NATO members, excluding ones not on Russia’s unfriendly country list, possess a total of around 1,472,510 active military personnel (Hackett, 2025b). On paper, this force is enough to match Russia, but it is insufficient when considering equipment numbers and the qualitative aspect of Europe’s military readiness. Some estimates require that to prevent a Russian breakthrough in the Baltics, 1,400 tanks, 2,000 infantry fighting vehicles, and 700 artillery pieces—more than what Germany, France, Italy, and the UK have in their arsenal (Burilkov, 2025). Besides that, problems of military coordination of a European response and recruitment, particularly in Northern Europe and the Baltics, are also persistent (Hackett, 2025b). Other elements Europe lacks are enablers—support capabilities such as reconnaissance, logistics, and intelligence typically provided by the US (Cook, 2025), which, especially after the fiasco in the Oval Office, has grown to show its indifference and extreme change in stance towards European affairs.

Steps Ahead

In light of these issues, efforts must be exerted to increase military power. Indeed, Europe’s overall spending on defence increased by 11.7% in 2024 (Hackett, 2025b). Focus on building insufficient aspects of Europe’s military, such as enablers, UAVs, and armour—also known as internal balancing—is salient. However, ramping up spending on individual nations is not enough. The issue of a continental chain of command and the question of who will lead it if the US does not commit to European defence must be answered with a solution. In this case, Europe must revisit its scrapped Cold War plans of establishing a European army with a centralized command not belonging to any one nation. Yet, learning from the past lessons left behind by the Pleven Plan, which soon proved to fail due to the end of the Korean War and hence the disappearance of a common enemy, there should be serious efforts to assess whether a centralized command is truly lucrative, relevant, and legitimate.

Another prime effort to nurture Europe’s military strength is supporting Ukraine. Since the war in Ukraine began, Russia has suffered heavy losses, including an estimated 45.000 casualties in November 2024 alone, 4,000 main battle tanks, 5,500 infantry fighting vehicles, and 3,000 armoured personnel carriers (Hackett, 2025a). This continued attrition of Russian forces and Ukraine’s battlefield experience are essential to counter and stall Russia’s growing incursion on European affairs. However, Ukraine has also suffered heavy losses along with shortages of manpower and equipment to mount a sustainable counterattack, as observed with the failed Kursk incursion. Therefore, continued European support of arms is a must to keep Russia at bay if peace has not been reached.

Europe’s reliance on the US had kept it safe from aggression for decades. However, this had bred complacency in the form of an underprepared military force. Problems of coordination, insufficient numbers, and lack of enablers plague Europe’s military force. The sudden (or perhaps not so, but at least has proven itself to be sudden because of recent Oval Office theatricals) unreliability of US protection makes achieving military independence imperative for Europe’s survival and deterrence against Russian aggression. For in this world of anarchy, who will guarantee Europe’s protection if not itself?

References

Arhirova, H. US says it brokered deal to end fighting in the Black Sea in talks with Ukraine and Russia. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-ceasefire-talks-saudi-arabia-02cd8e100113bc9e80c7a737bf01c796.

Burilkov, A. Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is needed. Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed. 

Cheng, M. & Weissert, W. (2025, January 22). Trump wants to pull out of the World Health Organization again. Here’s what may happen next. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/trump-withdraws-from-world-health-organization-697bbd79a95ae0b6a5d47fa4131f6329.

Cook, E. (2025). How NATO Without the US Stacks Up Against Russia. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/nato-without-us-military-russia-comparison-2040393.

Hackett, J. (Ed.). (2025a). Chapter Four: Russia and Eurasia. The Military Balance, 124(1), 152–205. https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2025.2445476. 

Hackett, J. (Ed.). (2025b). Chapter Three: Europe. The Military Balance, 124(1), 52–151. https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2025.2445475. 

Hutzler, A. (2025, March 1). Trump and Zelenskyy key takeaways: Oval Office meeting explodes into shouting match. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/key-takeaways-tempers-flare-trump-vance-confront-ukraines/story.

Kilander, G. (2025, March 2). “US senator joins Elon Musk in calling for withdrawal from NATO.” Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/elon-musk-nato-donald-trump-b2707635.html.

Peterson Foundation. (2024, August 12). Chart Pack: Defense Spending. Peterson Foundation. https://www.pgpf.org/article/chart-pack-defense-spending/.

Sayle, T. A. (2019). Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order. Cornell University Press.