Written by: Sanria Zerlina Brezky (Staff of Career Organizational Development)

Recently, Indonesia has faced a security crisis triggered by various domestic policies widely perceived as corrupt and abuse of power. Widespread protests have erupted across multiple regions, impacting instability. As is often the case, there has been violence against civilians by the police force, including the deployment of tear gas—a chemical weapon classified as a riot control agent. The use of tear gas by law enforcement has been “so normalized” that it has become an “almost routine aspect of daily life.”

WHAT IS TEAR GAS?

Tear gas is classified as a type of riot control agent (RCA), which is also referred to as lachrymatory agents, peripheral chemosensory irritants (PCSI), and harassing agents (Sollom, 2012). There are many different types of chemicals used by law enforcement and the military, but the most common are Chloroacetophenone (CN), Chlorobenzylidene Malonitrile(CS), Dibenzoxazepine, and Trichloronitromethane (pepper gas).

According to the  Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which oversees compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), RCA is defined as “any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.”

Tear gas can be seen as something that is closely involved in the history and transitions of warfare (de Larrinaga, 2016). Tear gas was originally developed for military purposes, with its first use occurring during World War I. Over time, its composition expanded to include substances such as chlorine and mustard gas. During WWI, French and German forces frequently employed chloroacetophenone (CN), especially in trench warfare, to dislodge enemy troops from their positions.

After World War I, international concern over chemical weapons intensified, including scrutiny of tear gas. Ironically, the use of tear gas for domestic unrest has seen a significant rise. In 1928, American scientists developed ortho-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS) gas, which is approximately five times more potent than Chloroacetophenone (CN). CS gas was later weaponized in the mid-1950s and was widely used during the Vietnam War to clear tunnels and bunkers utilized by Viet Cong forces (Historia, 2019).

Rather than being banned, CS has become more widely used than its predecessor, CN, due to its stronger irritant effects and greater effectiveness in crowd control. Symptoms of CS exposure include severe tearing, burning sensations in the nose and throat, eye spasms, chest tightness, coughing, wheezing, and other signs of oral and respiratory distress (Sollom & Atkinson, 2012).

American College of Emergency Physicians  also stated that:

“Lacrimators are rapid-acting irritants that can induce severe pain, excessive tearing, mucosal irritation, and potentially contact dermatitis. While these injuries are generally minor and self-limiting, they can also be linked to inhalation injuries of varying severity, from mild to life-threatening. Individuals exposed to these substances often report a burning sensation in the skin, eyes, nose, and mouth, along with symptoms such as runny nose, blurred vision, difficulty swallowing, skin rashes, and possible nausea and vomiting.”

CHEMICAL WEAPON CONVENTION: WHAT DOES IT SAY ABOUT TEAR GAS?

In 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was officially ratified, but it only entered into force in 1997. According to Article 1 of the Convention, all types of chemical weapons, including riot control agents, are prohibited from use in warfare. Prior to this, the 1925 Geneva Protocol also addressed the prohibition of tear gas in warfare, which included in “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gasses, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.” However, this prohibition does not extend within the borders of a sovereign nation against its own citizens. Thus, law enforcement is empowered to use RCAs for riot control (Brown et al, 2021).

The CWC categorizes chemicals into three distinct groups: Chemical Weapons (Annex I), Toxic Chemicals (Annex II), and Scheduled Chemicals (Annex III). Tear gas, classified as a riot control agent, falls under Annex III as “Scheduled Chemicals” and is considered a “less-lethal” weapon (Sollom & Atkinson, 2012). This underscores how the state is normalizing the use of tear gas in response to unrest.

It is paradoxical that a weapon banned in warfare is permitted for use against civilians.

HOW THE PRODUCTION OF TEAR GAS PROLIFERATED AND BECAME WIDELY USED IN CONTROLLING PROTESTS

General Amos Fries played a crucial role in the development and advocacy of tear gas, particularly in military and crowd control contexts. As the head of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS), Fries was instrumental in advancing chemical weapons during World War I and later championed the use of tear gas and other irritants as effective and “humane” tools for controlling domestic unrest. However, he faced strong opposition from military leaders, including Secretary of War Newton Baker and General John J. Pershing. Baker explicitly prohibited the use of tear gas and other chemical agents for crowd control or their distribution to local law enforcement. Despite this, Fries spent the following two years trying to persuade military and government officials that chemical weapons could be an effective and humane alternative for riot control.

In support of his advocacy, Fries developed the “Provisional Instructions for the Control of Mobs by Chemical Warfare,” a document providing interim guidelines on the use of chemical weapons, including tear gas, for managing crowds or mobs in the United States. This document aimed to standardize and legitimize the use of chemical agents in domestic law enforcement, reflecting Fries’ determination to normalize these practices despite significant opposition.

Following the introduction of chemical weapons and their standardization by Fries, the use of tear gas by governments against civilians has become increasingly prevalent, raising significant concerns about the ethical implications and potential abuses of such measures.

According to Sollom & Atkinson (2012), Within the past year and a half, governments of Arab Spring countries including those of Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen have deployed toxic chemical agents against their civilian populations. Similar tactics have also been used by governments in Chile, Honduras, Israel, Panama, Turkey, and Uganda. The use of riot control agents against protesters is nothing new (Daft, 2020). A particularly comparable case occurred in Hong Kong, and South Korea in 1987, where authorities used hundreds of thousands of canisters of toxic chemicals over two months to suppress civilian uprisings in Seoul (Daft, 2020; Sollom & Atkinson, 2012; Earl, 2003). Like in Bahrain, civilians in South Korea exposed to these chemicals experienced acute illnesses and severe health issues, often without seeking medical care due to fear of police and government reprisal.

TEAR GAS CRISIS IN INDONESIA: WHAT DOES THE LAW SAY?

In the Indonesian context, the use of tear gas against demonstrators remains a persistent issue. Despite its promising economic development, Indonesia’s political landscape is still fraught with weaknesses, particularly where political authorities have been perceived as too corrupt and inept to respond effectively (Slater, 2006). These weaknesses have also permeated security institutions, such as the Indonesian National Police (Polri). 

As a democratic nation, Indonesia grants its citizens the right to express their opinions, as enshrined in Article 28E(3) of the 1945 Constitution, which states that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of association, assembly, and expression.” This is further reinforced by Police Regulation No. 9 of 2008 (Peraturan Kapolri Nomor 9 Tahun 2008), which outlines the procedures for organizing, securing, and handling public demonstrations. However, in practice, demonstrators are often met with repressive actions by Polri, resulting in injuries and even fatalities. Polri’s repressive tendencies are evident in the fact that the institution consistently ranks among the top five most frequently reported to the National Commission on Human Rights (Riyadi, 2020). This repressive pattern includes the use of tear gas to suppress unrest, which constitutes a violation of human rights.

A recent incident occurred during the protests against the new Regional Elections Bill (RUU Pilkada). Citizens organized demonstrations in various locations to express their discontent with what they perceived as government “abuse of power.” According to BBC Indonesia, the Advocacy Team for Democracy (TAUD) received at least 51 complaints regarding police violence during the protests against the passage of the RUU Pilkada in front of the DPR Building on Thursday, August 22, 2024. These complaints included reports of violence and intimidation against journalists—such as those from Tempo, Narasi, and Pikiran Rakyat—as well as violence against demonstrators and the use of tear gas. Additionally, the Instagram account @thinkpolicyid reported that 32 students in Semarang had to be hospitalized due to injuries and symptoms caused by police violence and exposure to tear gas. Even children reciting prayers at the Taqwa Mosque in Sekayu were affected by tear gas used by the authorities.

As cited from Narasi Newsroom official instagram account @narasinewsroom, the use of tear gas is regulated under Police Regulation No. 1 of 2009, which outlines six stages of force in police actions:

1. The first stage involves the use of deterrent measures,
2. The second stage involves verbal commands,
3. The third stage involves soft empty-hand control,
4. The fourth stage involves hard empty-hand control,
5. The fifth stage involves the use of blunt weapons, chemical agents such as tear gas or pepper spray, or other tools in accordance with police standards,
6. The sixth stage involves the use of firearms or other instruments to stop actions or behaviors that could cause serious injury or death to police officers or the public.

In this framework, the use of tear gas is situated at the fifth stage, meaning that the police are required to initiate crowd dispersal beginning with the first stage. However, in practice, this sequence is not always followed.

Following the framework, according to Article 13 of Police Regulation No. 9 of 2008, during public demonstrations, government officials are actually obligated to: a) protect human rights; b) respect the principle of legality; c) uphold the presumption of innocence; and d) ensure security. Furthermore, Article 14(1)(a) emphasizes that the police are responsible for “providing security protection to participants in public demonstrations.” So, the question is how can it be claimed that the police are fulfilling their duties as “providers of security,” and their obligation to “protect human rights” when they disperse crowds using tear gas? 

HAVE THE AUTHORITIES NORMALIZED THE USE OF TEAR GAS?

Clashes between the police and the public are a frequent occurrence, reflecting a deep-seated mistrust of the police force that is deeply concerning. Despite this, the police continue to exhibit aggressive behavior. The frequent use of Riot Control Agents (RCA) by officers is particularly troubling and represents “normalization” of the use of tear gas. Yosua & Asfinawati (2024) argue that to end the issue of police brutality and preserve democracy, comprehensive cultural, institutional, and instrumental reforms are necessary—in essence, a “total reform” of the police institution is required.

The troubling history of tear gas use in Indonesia is marked by several significant incidents that highlight the dangers associated with its normalization. Notable among these are the 2019 student protests against the proposed revision of the Criminal Code, where excessive tear gas deployment led to widespread injuries and public outcry. More recently, the Kanjuruhan Stadium disaster in 2022, where the use of tear gas by police resulted in a deadly stampede, killing over 130 people, serves as a stark reminder of the lethal consequences that can arise from its misuse.

The Kanjuruhan tragedy is highly controversial due to the improper use of tear gas, which violated existing legal regulations. According to Perkapolri No. 10 of 2022 on the Security of Sports Competitions, Article 30(b) explicitly states that if supporters do not comply with officers’ orders, the response should involve the following measures: 1) the use of physical restraint techniques, and 2) the use of blunt weapons. This indicates that physical restraint should be prioritized before resorting to tear gas, in accordance with the conditions set forth in Article 31. Furthermore, Article 31 strictly prohibits the use of riot control techniques (also known as Pengendalian Huru Hara/PHH), including tear gas, smoke grenades, and firearms, within Zone I and Zone II—areas within the ring road surrounding the stadium, particularly when the stadium is enclosed by a fence at least 2.5 meters high.

Beyond the immediate physical dangers, the normalization of tear gas use in Indonesia carries broader legal, health, and societal implications. Legally, the frequent use of tear gas raises questions about the adequacy of existing regulations and whether they sufficiently protect citizens’ rights to peaceful assembly. From a health perspective, exposure to tear gas can cause severe respiratory problems, psychological trauma, and long-term health issues, particularly among vulnerable populations such as children and the elderly. It is important to remember that health is a subject of Human Rights that the government should protect.

Meanwhile, the societal implications are equally troubling, as the routine use of tear gas by security forces can contribute to a climate of fear and mistrust between the public and law enforcement. This normalization not only threatens the democratic principles of freedom of expression and assembly but also signals a broader trend towards the militarization of public order management in Indonesia, necessitating urgent reforms to ensure that security measures do not undermine human rights.

INDONESIAN CORRUPTION WATCH: THE URGE FOR TRANSPARENCY

Lastly, the controversy surrounding tear gas has never been cleared. Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) discovered through the Indonesian National Police’s electronic procurement service (lpse.polri.go.id) that the police made five purchases of tear gas between December 2023 and February 2024, totaling Rp188.9 billion. These purchases were made by two units: the Mobile Brigade Corps (Korbrimob Polri) and the Security Maintenance Agency (Korsabhara Baharkam Polri). ICW raised three main concerns regarding these tear gas purchases. First, the police’s refusal to disclose procurement information, particularly the contracts, despite requests from ICW, KontraS, and Trend Asia, indicates a lack of transparency and potential corruption. ICW’s subsequent information dispute filed with the Central Information Commission (KIP) in December 2023 has yet to be resolved, raising suspicions of reluctance by KIP to challenge the police.

Second, there is a lack of accountability regarding the use of tear gas. ICW found that while one of the five procurement packages disclosed the purchase of 38,216 rounds of ammunition, the other four did not provide detailed information on the quantities purchased. This opacity hinders public accountability, especially given the police’s history of using tear gas indiscriminately and without oversight, which raises concerns about expired tear gas being used, as seen in the Kanjuruhan tragedy. 

Lastly, the purchase of tear gas occurred in a context where there was no immediate security threat, suggesting that the large expenditure was primarily aimed at suppressing civil dissent during the 2024 political season. This points to a flawed security strategy by the police, who appear to prioritize silencing taxpayers’ voices with tear gas over addressing the root causes of public criticism. Consequently, these tear gas purchases contribute to the ongoing misuse and waste of state funds. Therefore, on its official website, ICW urges the following actions:

1. The Indonesian National Police (Polri) to cease firing tear gas at protestors and civilian groups;
2. Polri to promptly disclose the tear gas purchase contracts worth Rp188.9 billion, funded by taxpayers;
3. Polri to immediately release accountability reports on the use of tear gas from 2019 to 2024;
4. Polri to halt further purchases of tear gas until all contracts and accountability reports are made public.
5. The Central Information Commission (KIP) to swiftly address the information dispute regarding the transparency of Polri’s tear gas procurement.

Fortunately, Indonesia still has civil society organizations that remain vigilant on such issues. The use of tear gas by law enforcement is not just a matter of public order; it represents a deeply repressive tactic that raises significant ethical and legal concerns. Tear gas, a chemical weapon banned in warfare due to its harmful effects, is paradoxically permitted for use against civilians—a stark contradiction that highlights the problematic nature of its deployment in domestic settings. This practice underscores a broader pattern of state-sanctioned violence that often targets those exercising their fundamental rights to protest and dissent.

The demands made by ICW are not just calls for transparency; they are a rallying cry for societal vigilance and collective action. The insistence on disclosing tear gas purchase contracts, accountability reports, and halting further acquisitions until these documents are made public is essential for upholding human rights and ensuring that law enforcement operates within the bounds of justice. If left unchallenged, the unchecked use of tear gas could signal a troubling normalization of state repression, further eroding the trust between the public and those meant to protect them. 

This issue is emblematic of a deeper crisis in the relationship between the state and its citizens. By advocating for transparency and accountability, civil society organizations like ICW are not just addressing a single instance of misuse but are challenging the broader culture of impunity that often accompanies state violence. It is imperative that we, as a society, heed their call and actively participate in holding our institutions accountable. The stakes are high; this is about safeguarding our rights, ensuring the integrity of our democratic processes, and fostering a more just and equitable society.

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